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The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market has been a subject of heated and highly 
polarised debate, and an object of intense lobbying from the outset. It grasped the attention of 
a multitude of stakeholders, including tech companies, publishers, platforms, creators and 
SMEs, and urged thousands of people to go out on the streets in a sign of protest against what 
they believed was the “end of the internet as we know it”. The debate was often emotional, and 
involved such terms as “meme ban”, “censorship”, “upload filters”, “link tax”, or a puzzling “value 
gap”. However, amongst those emotive catchphrases lies a foundational discussion on the 
purposes of copyright law, and how its relationship with artists, technology, media, news, culture 
and citizenship unfolded. 
In this presentation, we investigate how discourse developed during the negotiation phase of 
the Directive, focusing on the most controversial provisions: draft Articles 11 (press publishers’ 
right) and 13 (platform liability). Focusing on the period between publication of the proposal by 
the Commission in September 2016, and the adoption of the Directive by Parliament and Council 
in March/April 2019, we juxtapose these changes with an analysis of (1) parliamentary debates, 
(2) press releases by the Commission, Parliament and Council, and (3) 80 stakeholder 
submissions that sought to shape the evolving legislation. 
Through discourse analysis, we uncover four topoi that appear to dominate the debate: 
(a) Technocratic (responding to tech development by updating the copyright framework), (b) 
Value gap (the redistribution of revenues to benefit creators and producers), (c) Internet 
freedoms (freedom of expression and user interests), and (d) European (the promotion and 
protection of European culture and identity).  
Finally, we show that changes in the Directive’s text can be associated with the appearance and 
evolution of the discourse. 
We show that changes in the draft legislation can be associated with the appearance and 
evolution of the four topoi in the debates, but that changes in the proposed legal language tend 
to be obfuscatory, rather than addressing the issues. Controversial language such as “content 
identification” (associated with filtering) was removed and safeguards were offered, but many of 




(MK) Good morning to our neighbours across the city of Glasgow. So near, and yet so far. Also, 
good afternoon to our European friends on the participants’ list. Lunch hour has truly arrived 
there.  
Thank you Oles and Angela for making this seminar possible. It is a great pleasure to be here with 
my two colleagues Ula Furgal and Amy Thomas. I start by saying a few words how this project 
came about. 
In our pre-meeting this morning it was mentioned that we are close to the fourth anniversary of 
this piece of legislation. The first text of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
was issued as a proposal by the European Commission on 16th of September 2016. One of 
the questions we all have is: Did we spend the last four years of our life in the right manner so far 
as the Directive is concerned? 
Many of you will know that CREATe, our research institute, operated a digital resource during the 
long legislative process.3  
It was our aim to support a complicated policy process. We tracked committee reports, 
stakeholder submissions, new academic evidence, gossip about what happened in the trilogue. 
Anything that might matter for the process of policy formation. We did this because we wanted 
to bring independent academic input to the legislation.  
 
 
3 EU Copyright Reform: Evidence on the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (ed. Martin 
Kretschmer, Amy Thomas). CREATe Centre: University of Glasgow. https://www.create.ac.uk/policy-
responses/eu-copyright-reform/. See also: EU Copyright Reform: Evidence on the Implementation of the 
Copyright in Digital Single Market Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/790) (ed. Ula Furgał, Martin Kretschmer, 
João Pedro Quintais). CREATe Centre: University of Glasgow & reCreating Europe: 
https://www.create.ac.uk/cdsm-implementation-resource-page/for tracking of developments relating 







Amy worked for a couple of years on the timeline you just see in front of you, in parallel Ula 
worked on her PhD at the EUI in Florence on what was then Article 11, the press publishers’ right. 
We all were immersed in primary material relating to the Directive for years. 
When the COVID-19 lock-down happened in March, we were looking for projects that would 
enable CREATe academics to collaborate beyond isolation. And this material seemed relevant. 
You don't just collect all this primary material and then do nothing with it. This was the starting 
point of this paper. 
(AT) Starting in May 2017, I was responsible for tracking all of the key developments regarding 
the Directive. This information is distilled into our interactive timeline which details key votes, 
position papers, stakeholder interventions, user petitions, controversies, studies – anything that 
we thought was significant in the policy making process. I kept track of these via a few different 
sources, including news and stakeholder sites. Twitter in particular was a fruitful but at times 
very heated and toxic way to try and keep up to date with the latest developments. 
At the time of compiling the timeline, we broadly captured everything to do with the Directive 
and feel this is fairly comprehensive. Perhaps unsurprisingly due to its nature and controversy, 
our data is more skewed towards Article 13. Thankfully Ula was able to offer a valuable and 
detailed perspective on Article 11. 
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(UF) As already mentioned by Martin, in my doctoral dissertation, which I defended earlier this 
year, I have focused on Article 11 introducing the press publishers’ right. As a part of my research 
looking into how copyright is expanding to protect news and information, I have been monitoring 
the discussions between opponents and supporters of the Directive. I tried to identify and index 
all the open letters, statements and similar documents issued by stakeholders on the subject of 
Article 11. Our dataset for this project was created by combining the material which Amy and 
Martin gathered, and the documents I have collected for my PhD.  
 
(MK) We then reflected on the potential of this material and it seemed to us that we had 
a window on a European public sphere. We thought we could investigate whether public 
discourse had an effect on law-making in this specific setting of copyright law. The slide you see 





(AT) For those of you who haven’t used Google Trends before, this graph shows the relative 
popularity and relative search volume of searches on Google for a particular phrase, in this case 
for “Article 11” and “Article 13”. We set a given time period, over a given region; this represents 
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January 2018 – April 2019 worldwide. A score of 100 means that something was at its peak 
popularity for searches, 50 half as popular, and zero would mean least popular. 
To the extent we can treat Google searches as a proxy for public interest and engagement with 
the debate, we can see a definite increase in the popularity of these search terms which is 
roughly commensurate with key dates in the negotiation phase: first the 5 July plenary vote; then 
the 12 September plenary vote; the trilogue negotiations in November and December 2018, and; 
finally this huge spike at the time of the final vote where searches were at peak popularity. 
In the next slide we have an example of searches for Article 11 and 13 side by side. This confirms 
what we suspected that Article 13 was a vastly more popular search term than 11. You can see 




This is one way of demonstrating public engagement with the Directive, and also the particular 
articles that they were interested in. We think we see here a public discourse and legal discourse 





(MK) What was the theoretical question we would want to ask of this material? We identified, 
there is a public discourse. It spikes several times. It spikes at critical points of the law-making 
process. There were several aspects that seemed interesting.  
We were looking at one of the few instances where there seemed to be a genuinely European 
public space, a transnational discussion. One of the criticisms of the European Union has always 
been that it is a transnational entity but without a polity, without a collective identity or 
institutionalised form of social relations. There are only national discourses. But what we looked 
at here seemed to be discourse relations at a European level, albeit mostly likely among those 
with relevant expertise. Secondly, because we had a good window onto this policy making 
process, it may be possible to test if the conditions of public discourse matter for law-making. 
We decided to frame this within the classic theory of the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas’s 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit published in 1962 which many of you will know as The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. At the core of Habermas’s approach is the idea 
that there are certain conditions of discourse which lead to structural changes. The form of 
communication itself shapes the socio-economic system, and matters whether the outcome is 
normatively acceptable. 
In Habermas, this originally was presented as a kind of historic stylization of the birth of liberal 
society where authority is derived from agreement not political will. You may have heard of 
the idea of London coffee houses around 1800 as an early form of public space. For our 
contemporary setting, it is plausible to assume that under certain (public) conditions of 
communication, the development and exchange of arguments may lead to laws that are in some 
ways “better”. 
There are critiques of this framework. Does a functioning public sphere assume that we are all 
equal in the discourse process? That's an enlightenment assumption, an optimistic take on 
human reason that does not take account of socio-economic inequalities that may persists in 
national and transnational settings. 
So it is not straightforward that a Habermasian theory of the public sphere will work, but it offers 
an compelling perspective. Why do we conduct this seminar here? Why do we try to engage in 
discussion if we think that informed and critical discourse does not matter. Why do we do it? 
Why do academics make submissions into the policy process? Why do interest groups make 
submissions using reasoned arguments? If law-making is all just a reflection of power (and 
arguments are just a deflection), we are really in a difficult situation. And perhaps we are. 
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There are some limitations to treating the Copyright Directive as a European coffee house, so to 
speak. All materials we collected are in the English language. We think this is justifiable if we can 
show that the European public sphere is constituted in English. There are indications that 
actually may be the case. Stakeholders publish their position papers in English. Even legislative 
developments at national level are often translated into English. For example, when the first 
German draft for the national implementation of the Copyright Directive was discussed, it was 
also offered as an English translation, so that it could influence the European policy process. So 
the assumption that European level discourse takes place in English is we think defensible. 
A second limitation is that the discourse surrounding the Directive was not only text-based. 
Interventions on social media were often visual, the memes we refer to in the title of our paper. 
The orthodox understanding of discourse-based reasoning relies on words. It has, to our 
knowledge, never been applied to the type of intermedial interchange we are observing in 
the context of the Copyright Directive. This second limitation could also be considered as 
an opportunity. Perhaps web-based discourse allows us to explore something more theoretically 
ambitious about the conditions for a public sphere in the digital environment. 
How did we construct the dataset? We cover three and a half years from September 2016. We 
have the initial legislative proposal, which then changed over time until the adoption by the 
European Parliament, the Council and official publication on May 17th, 2019. The primary sources 
on which we built our content and then discourse analysis are three: Transcriptions of the 
parliamentary debates which coincide with two of the spikes in public interest; Press releases 
of the Commission (5), Parliament (3) and Council (3); Finally, we catalogued 80 stakeholders 
submissions relating to articles 11 (press publishers’ right) and 13 (new rules for platform liability), 
the two most controversial provisions.4  
 
4 We use the original article numbers in this paper because the provisions were known and referred to as 
such during the period we investigate, before being renumbered right at the end of the legislative process. 






Once these decisions are taken: you have got a theory, you’ve got the data, then you need 







First, you need to know what has changed in the legal drafting, amendments, new provisions 
introduced. Then you have to relate those in some ways to the public discourse.  
In order to do this, we captured the public discourse initially by a traditional kind of quantitative 
content analysis. We constructed frequency tables of the 12 most used terms in each set of 
primary sources. Then we dived deeper into a discourse analysis that has enabled us to identify 
what we call topoi, groups of concepts used in argumentation. The construction of a topos 
(plural: topoi) is a particular approach to discourse analysis. 
In a third step, we link the changes in law and the discourse. If it was this simple, the paper would 
be published already. 
Now I hand over to Ula and Amy, to start with step one. What did actually happen to Articles 11 
and 13 during the legislative process? 
 
(UF) Article 11, as I hope we all already know, introduces a new neighbouring (related) right for 
publishers of press publications. The right which was originally proposed in September 2016, was 






We started with a right which was effective erga omnes [towards all] and covered all digital uses 
of press publications. What we ended up having, however, is a right that covers only online uses 
by information society service providers, not all internet users. This new right is granted to 
the publishers of press publications. The definition of a press publication did not change that 
much throughout the time, however, the right was eventually granted only to those publishers 
who were established in one of the Member States.  
Some important changes to the text of the right, or more accurately a multitude of carve-outs to 
the right’s scope, were included in the final text of the Directive. Essentially, the press publishers’ 
right gives publishers of press publications a bundle of two rights: a right of reproduction and 
a right of making available. However, the press publishers’ right does not cover all hyperlinks – 
originally it was inapplicable only to those links which were not acts of communication to 
the public. The press publishers’ right also does not apply to individual words and very short 
extracts, as well as to private or non-commercial uses by of individual users.  
What is also significant is that the term of the right has been shortened from 20 to two years. It 
is a considerable change to the right’s duration.  
In the final text of the Directive we also have a guarantee of a fair share of the revenues which 
press publishers will generate based on this new right to journalists and other authors whose 
works are included in a press publication.  
 
(AT) The doctrinal changes to Article 13 were substantive. We saw a relatively simple three-






Initially, the original Commission proposal sought to modify the existing safe harbour regime 
provided under the E-Commerce Directive, and compelled Information Society Service 
Providers (ISSPs) to either ensure the functioning of agreements with rightsholders, or 
otherwise to prevent availability of their works on their platforms through effective content 
recognition technologies. At this point, there was no consideration of how non-infringing user-
generated works would escape the ambit of this, though there was the suggestion of at least 
a complaints and redress mechanism.  
There were numerous developments, many of which focused on softening this otherwise very 
explicit starting point. The finished result is very different from the original Commission 
proposal, and an amalgamation of these developments. 
We now have direct liability for Online Content Sharing Service Providers (OCSSPs), a sub-set of 
ISSPs, who communicate to the public when they give access to protected works. 
Instead of ensuring the functioning of agreements we now ask that platforms make “best efforts” 
to obtain authorisations from rightsholders.  
Most notably we no longer have the stark language of “effective content recognition 
technologies” and this is softened considerably to making “best efforts” and using “suitable and 
effective means” to ensure that works are unavailable in accordance with “high industry 
standards of professional diligence”. 
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We now have mandatory user exceptions for (a) quotation, criticism, review and (b) caricature, 
parody or pastiche. 
We now also exclude certain platforms from the ambit of the provision depending on their 
function, such as not-for-profit encyclopedias (like Wikipedia) or open source software sharing 
platforms (like GitHub). We also have a “lite” version of Article 13 for new and small platforms. 
Overall, this is quite a transformation, but the core of the original Commission text stays the 
same; platforms must now either agree a licence with rightsholders or find a way to make their 
work unavailable - now with some exceptions. 
 
(MK) Having identified doctrinal developments during the legislative process, we now move to 
the analysis of the policy discourse. We start with a quantitative content analysis. Using “word 









For the lead concept for each group. We then dived deeper and investigated in which context 
the concepts were used. We demonstrate our approach for two concepts: “Platform” and 
“European”. 
 
(UF) The first concept we are going to consider is European. To understand the context in which 
the adjective European was used, we went back to our dataset and checked which nouns it was 










Among created groupings, two are prevalent. The first group, is cultural identity, and it includes 
such nouns as culture, Europeans, citizens, common values, arts, cultural sector and heritage. 
The second grouping is content business, and it covers those who produce cultural content: 
publishers, producers, broadcasters, but also content itself: film, media, audiovisual content 
The second concept is Platform. Here, we first searched our dataset for phrases which include 
the word platform. As the graph shows, the word platform was used 262 times as a part of 43 
different phrases. Most commonly, however, the word platform was used by itself. A word 







In the second step of our analysis, we examined in which contexts the word platform and 
the phrases including it were used. Two dominant contexts were liability and remuneration, 






(MK) After we explored the discourse context of the dominant concepts in detail, we then re-
arranged the frequency tables into four topoi. That is an iterative process. If you ever engaged 
in discourse analysis, you will know that there is no “right” answer. You try to get as close to 
the meaning as you can. You try to make sense, review groupings and context again and again. 
We went through a lengthy process of about two months, coding and re-coding, back and forth. 
In fortnightly meetings we discussed possible topoi and their instantiation. So what you see here 




We finally settled on the following four topoi that seemed to have explanatory potential in 
shaping the policy discourse: Technocratic, Value gap, Freedom and European. We shall say a bit 
more about each of these.  
In order to offer a descriptive indication how the topos analysis of reasoning fits into the initial 
frequency tables, we have re-coded these in this slide, with one colour for each topos. The 12 
most used words in each primary dataset are now allocated to one of those four topoi. This gives 
you an intuitive feeling for the structure of the policy discourse as a whole. For example, you see 
immediately that the value gap topos dominates reasoning.
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The technocratic topos is strong among the press releases. Regarding the value gap, we 
perceived a strange fusion of interests between labour (creators) and capital (right holders) 
against other capital (GAFA). The freedom topos we expected to be associated with user 
interests. This turned out differently, as you will see. And finally, the European topos, with 
a focus on culture and identity, seemed to carry protectionist undertones.  
Now we’ll illustrate each of these four topoi in more detail. Memes, as we promised in 
the announcement for this seminar, will feature. 
(AT) The first topos we found was that many parts of the debate were technocratic in nature; 
there’s a drive to address the internet era with updated legislation. As this meme succinctly 





As you can see in the quote on the slides, this was very much presented as a “do or die” scenario. 
The discourse talked frequently about how the internet has changed everything, about how we 
need an update for the digital era and to address the challenges of the digital age. 
More so than this, proponents of the Directive show this as being a very desirable position – they 
talk about putting Europe at the forefront of the digital revolution and to be a world model in this 
area. We are invited to infer from this that the Directive is a necessary intervention against this 
abstract, compelling force of digital-ness and revolution. Supporting the Directive becomes 
positioned as an objective and rational goal in the face of that challenge. 
This theme started out as very important at the start of the debate as the impetus to set 
the Directive in motion, but over time it frittered out as more technical challenges and 
disagreements began. So, whilst everyone agreed that change was needed, most of the debate 
was spent talking about how exactly that change should take place. 
 
(UF) The next topos we are going to discuss is value gap. As already mentioned, this topos was 





At the heart of the value gap topos lies the idea that creators and creative sectors should be fairly 
renumerated. The term value gap itself has been used in the official communications of the EU 
institutions only once. The Council has defined a value gap as a difference between 
remuneration received by creators and performers for their works, and the revenue platforms 
are generating by making those works accessible. 
What is quite interesting is that even though the EU institutions abandoned the value gap 
language, the term value gap has been consistently used by stakeholders until the very end of 
the debate. The stakeholders used the term value gap only in connection to Article 13, which 
came to be known as the “so-called value gap provision”. However, the rationale behind the value 
gap, the calls for the fair remuneration of creators, were omnipresent, and they went beyond 
discussion on Article 13.  
As a part of this topos, we see a very negative view on platforms. Platforms are considered 
parasites who steal content, wield tremendous power, and who do not want to share their 
revenues with creators and creative industries. However, platforms are not seen as a monolithic 
group. There is a clear distinction between small and large platforms, since it is only the major, 
big platforms who should share their revenues. Even the communications from the EU 
institutions use the term “tech giants” and name Google, Facebook and YouTube as platforms 
who should remunerate the authors. On the opposite side of the spectrum are non-commercial 
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platforms, with GitHub and Wikipedia often used as examples. Those types of platforms should 
be excluded from the new regulation. 
The idea of balance is omnipresent. The purpose of the Directive is the creation of a level-playing 
field between the stakeholders, by rebalancing the relationship between GAFA (Google, Apple, 
Facebook and Amazon), and “those who feed them”. The goal of this rebalancing exercise, is 
a guarantee that creators receive renumeration, which is described as fair, proportional or 
simply adequate.  
The general claim is that creators should be paid, however this claim is tackled differently for 
Articles 11 and Article 13. When it comes to Article 13, we clearly see that creators are to receive 
a fair share of revenues generated by platforms directly from those platforms. In the case of 
Article 11, there is a proxy: a press publisher. Journalists and other authors of works included in 
a press publication are to receive a fair share, but of what press publishers receive from 
platforms. The publishers are the ones to negotiate on behalf of authors. 
The value gap topos engages very emotional language while discussing the protection of 
authors’ livelihoods. One of my favourite quotes is that authors should not be “paid through tips”.  
 
(AT) The third topos is what we’ve dubbed the freedoms topos. And here we even have 
Mr. Freedom himself, Mel Gibson, screaming for memes. I think this is the sentiment that 




As many of you may know, the Directive stirred up lots of concerns that freedoms would either 
be taken away from us through Orwellian-style surveillance of upload filters. So, the concerns 
about freedom were expressed both in a positive sense – an entitlement to upload and post a 
link, for example – and a negative sense – such as freedom from surveillance.  
As we anticipated, these types of arguments were prevalent in discourse from the opposition. 
But surprisingly, we found that the discourse from supporters of the Directive also frequently 
talked about freedoms. This doesn’t mean they necessarily agreed with the same sentiment. You 
can see on the slide the suggestion that freedom in this sense is freedom from the tyranny of 
platforms, and freedom to make platforms responsible for their actions. Or stakeholders that 
say that not allowing creators to make a living from their work is the real threat to freedom of 
expression and the free flow of information online. 
So, opponents engage with the language of the freedoms topos but for different reasons. They 
adopt the language and turn it into something that ultimately supports their argument to support 
the Directive. This may have been an effort to build rapport by engaging with the language of 
opponents and echoing the main concerns from the public – that perhaps we’re not so different 
after all and our interests are aligned. In fact, come the end of the debate, press releases boast 
that the Directive will now allow users to upload copyright protected content, suggesting this 
wasn’t the case before. They change from saying that they’ll safeguard and preserve user 
interests to saying that they’ll enhance the existing user rights regime. The take home message 
becomes that users will have more freedoms and be better off than if the Directive had never 
been enacted at all. 
 





The gist of the European topos is the call to protect European cultural identity. A commonly used 
analogy is David vs Goliath. The role of Goliath is played by the US tech giants who exploit the rich 
cultural heritage of Europe. David stands for European authors, those who create and who are 
inherently a weaker party. 
To some extent the European topos is a reincarnation of the value gap argument. The European 
topos has some protectionist characteristics: foreign platforms, “giants of Silicon Valley” are 
exploiting and benefitting from rich cultural heritage created by European authors.  
This connects the European topos to broader debates on platform regulation, and especially the 
issue of taxation of American tech giants.  
 
(MK) Now we come to the initial findings. We had the analysis of the legal changes; we identified 
what we believe are the key argumentative patterns which we call topoi. What does the story tell 





(AT) To visualise the bigger picture and significance of these topoi, we created a doughnut 
chart. Each colour corresponds to a different topos and the size of segment relates to the 
weighting and emphasis that’s given to each of them. Each layer of the doughnut represents a 
different source of our primary data so you can see how each gave different weight to each topos 
and any patterns to be discerned from this. 
First, you see the technocratic topos is most frequently cited in press releases, which by their 
nature have to show the need for the Directive and promote it, and then secondarily by 
stakeholders in respect of Articles 11 and 13. But this is used far less frequently in the Parliament. 
We think that this is because MEPs showed more of a consensus about the need for change in 
response to the internet era, but this in itself was not the main topic of debate, rather the form 
of those changes. 
Secondly, in terms of the value gap topos, you can clearly see how overall this dominates in most 
of the sources, with the exclusion of opponents in the Parliament, confirming what we 
anticipated. So, discussions about things like the value of creators, their entitlement to 
remuneration, and the responsibility of platforms are the primary concern throughout 
the negotiations. In turn, we would anticipate that the final text of the Directive should be most 
reflective of this topos. 
Thirdly, perhaps unsurprisingly, the freedoms topos is most prominent with opponents in 
the Parliament, which we anticipated, but more surprisingly there is this small but definitely 
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present usage of the topos throughout each of the sources, even from proponents of 
the Directive, which we did not anticipate. We suspected they might refer to the language of 
freedom just to dismiss it – so to say there isn’t a concern about freedom of expression or 
censorship, for example. And whilst this type of discourse is definitely present, as I mentioned 
earlier there is a much more interesting form of discourse, particularly with stakeholders and 
proponents in the Parliament, where they repurpose the language of freedom and adapt it to suit 
their own argument. So, the argument becomes that freedom of expression is in fact secured by 
the Directive because it enables creators to make a living, for example. The usage of 
the freedoms topos in this instance certainly doesn’t correspond with the same sentiment as 
the opponents, and the result is that the topos becomes muddied and absorbed by proponents 
of the Directive, rather than being a clear line of argumentation adopted by its opponents. 
Lastly, you can see that when it comes to the European topos and European cultural values, this 
line of argumentation is completely absent in the arguments by opponents in the Parliament. 
This is very evident from the outset of our research when we look back to the frequency tables. 
For example, proponents in the Parliament mention “European” and “Culture” over 50 times in the 
transcriptions, whereas opponents mention these values only five times. This is an appreciable 
difference, and clearly the European topos is something that’s more likely to be adopted if you 
are supporting the Directive. It could be called a defensive topos. 
(MK) These are already quite exciting findings. Regarding the value gap, we all would have 
suspected that this dominated the discourse. We expected that. But what we found about 
the use of Internet freedom arguments is very interesting. While the topos was introduced by 
user interests (i.e. opponents of Arts. 11 and 17 as proposed by the Commission), during 
the legislative process the proponents of the Directive absorbed the discourse. This is 
rhetorically very interesting.  
A second observation: European identity, as articulated in the European topos seems to have 
been handed over to the proponents of the Directive, at least in parliamentary debate. In effect, 
a good European can’t be an opponent of the Directive. 
We tried to capture these trends in discourse patterns over time. This is a stylized 
representation. We assigned values in a spreadsheet. Discourse analysis normally should not be 
represented in this (positivistic) form. Still we wanted to illustrate movement, how the public 





Here you see that technocratic language disappears, freedom language emerges and becomes 
the most important discourse (memes), and in the process of becoming important is adopted by 
the proponents of the Directive. The value gap is there all the way through, and the European 
discourse gets hooked to the value gap discourse (platforms as parasites). 
This is our analysis of the discourse. So what does it tell us about the public sphere? What does 
it tell us about the big theoretical picture we are trying to paint? 
The challenge is to articulate a link between the discourse, the process of policy formation and 
changes in the law. This is not a one-directional, causal relationship. Let us make some 





Here we look specifically at Article 13 (later 17), new obligations on platforms that host content 
uploaded by users. Let’s consider three changes.  
First, the language of “content recognition technologies” disappears. This phrase, associated in 
the public's mind with filtering systems, was removed and replaced with a different language. 
Under Article 4(4), Online Content Sharing Service Providers shall be liable for unauthorised acts 
of communication to the public unless the service providers demonstrate that they have “made 
best efforts to obtain an authorization” and “best efforts to ensure unavailability”, taking account 
the availability of “suitable and effective means”. 
The language has changed but the effect remains the same. There is a new obligation for certain 
platforms. They become liable if they don’t prevent availability. You can only prevent liability if 
you have a mechanism for filtering. So the change in language is window dressing. It responds 
to the public discourse, but only in form not in substance. 
The second example is the introduction of user exceptions under Article 17(7). This looks like 
a substantive change. For the first time, we have mandatory user exceptions in European law. 
When uploading, users must be able to rely on the exceptions for “quotation, criticism, review” 
and “for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche”. 
Here the question is how this provision will be operationalised in the implementation phase. 
The freedoms may be there in law, but how are they preserved? What is the redress mechanism? 
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One of the ideas floated, for example in the German implementation draft, is that you, as 
an uploading user can flag if you think that your material falls under a copyright exception. This 
would then override technological filters and necessitate human review. That looks like 
a meaningful operationalisation. 
From what we hear from Germany, this implementation draft has now been vetoed by the CDU 
within the Coalition Government. The effects of the nice words in the Directive depend on the 
politics of national implementation. The same dynamics appear to happen at national level as 
they did at European level. So our diagnosis is that this change, responding to the freedom 
discourse, also could end up as window dressing, as something that is not effective in practice.  
Lastly, let’s consider which platforms are within the scope of the new Article 13/17 obligations. 
The amended text of the Directive now includes a carve-out for smaller platforms and also a long 
list of exclusions under the definition of Online Content Sharing Service Provider in Article 2. 
That really made a big difference. Wikipedia, GitHub, eBay, Dropbox all were in effect exempted 
from the new liability, as well as start-ups (as long as they don’t reach a turnover of EURO 10 




This is our concluding slide. Struggling with this particular issue, how to link discourse and law-
making, we have colour coded how changes in legal language may reflect one or more of the four 
topoi that shaped the policy discourse. Does this picture reflect a public sphere where 




The original title of our paper was “Disharmonisation and the failure of a European public sphere”. 
On reflection this is too stark. Public discourse did indeed matter, but there was an elusive 
relationship to the law-making process. Legal language changed sometimes in an ineffective or 
even deceptive way. Discovering these processes of managed incorporation of difficult counter 
arguments would appear to be a genuinely new insight. We would be very interested to hear your 
comments. We have presented a complex picture with an uncertain answer. There is certainly 
engagement in the production of distinctive discourses occasioned by legislation of EU-wide 
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